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Further to a consideration of existing research on income allocation processes in CA 
partnerships, this report answers the questions: how was income allocated in the Big 8 and 
their predecessor firms in New Zealand, and why is stability for income allocation systems 
compromised by the need for these systems to accommodate the 'rainmakers'? The narratives 
of the views of sun'ey and oral history interviewees participants on income allocation is 
complemented by a case study comparing and contrasting two firm changes, illustrated by 
partner narratives from two firms: Coopers & Lybrand and Deloittes Haskins Sells. The 
variety of income allocation models is attributed to the necessity for partners to undertake 
multiple roles in each partnership: "professional firms live or die by the rainmakers". It will 
be suggested that the previous advocacy of agency perspectives and theory of the firm 
theoretical perspectives do not provide a close fit with the data from this study. Instead, a 
population ecology approach (as adopted in organisational theory) is invoked to explain the 
constant flux in the choice of income allocation models in accounting partnerships 
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survival of the partnership, as will be further described in this study. 
The 1980s had been a tough time for CA firms. "Business raw in tooth and claw" would not 
be exaggerating the pressure from the boom and bust cycle. Two particular statistics 
displayed in the following chart are a reminder of the pressures on firms to adjust to changes 
in circumstances after the 1987 Crash. 
[Insert "Figure 1: New Zealand: highs and lows" about here] 
How did partners in the Big 8 survive the redundancies following the two big mergers in that 
period (Deloittes with Touche; Ernst & Whinney with Arthur Young) as well as the downturn 
in the economic cycle? The perceived significance of income allocation models by some 
survey respondents in the differential patterns of survival was probed further in interviews 
with 40 Big 8 partners. Some of the material from these oral history interviews addressed 
these issues, and provides a much-needed diversity in personal obsel".ations on the evolution 
and adaptation in systems of income allocation in CA firms in the last thirty years. This study 
repor.s on issues of income allocation and performance-based compensation in the Big 8 
firms and their predecessors, reyiewing driYers to changes in allocation systems in order to 
ensure that the remaining partners in the Big 6 of the 1990s got their fair cut of the cake. 
Existing literature 
An exploratory study of income allocation of the Big 6 in Australia by Burrows and Black 
was based on telephone interviews with one partner from each of the Big 6 in Melbourne in 
19952• They found that broad-scope profit pools were the norm; the extreme of this is the 
Arthur Andersen international profit pool. It was also the only firm with separate pools for 
consulting and accounting at that time. The interviews revealed some forward-looking 
comments, such as firms considering wider profit pools. They also reported some detailed 
data concerning the profit-sharing ratios for new partners and established partners. All the 
schemes were similar with regard to the process of determining the profit shares, with 
portions or units being allocated on an annual or biennial assessment process. Their five key 
findings related to: 
Absence of direct linkage between profit shares and short-run returns, and a generally 
broad pooling of profits; but suggesting risk-averse attitudes among partners; 
Support for an agency perspective, as there had occurred a shift away from equal 
sharing to variable profit shares; 
1 Burrows, G. & C. Black. 1998. Profit sharing in Australian Big 6 accounting firms: an exploratory study. 
Accounting Organizations and Society 23 (5/6): 517 - 530. 
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Diverse levels of shares for established partners; 
Binding effects offirm specific capital arrangements; and 
Comfort levels with a spread of profit shares, as long as the spread did not exceed the 
top partners receiving more than double the lowest receiying partners 
This study further extends the first research question put by Burrows and Black: how do the 
Big 6 firms share profits; and also provides further data towards answering their third 
question: why do they use their particular profit sharing systems? Although Burrows and 
Black considered this third research question was not amenable to direct enquiry, the data 
utilised in this research do indeed provide some answers to that question. 
Prior to Burrows and Black's study, there was some earlier research such as the review of 
systems in CPA firms in the USA by Steven C Hunt (1995)3. The focus on performance 
evaluation in public accounting, and of auditors in particular, demonstrated that one 
motivation for performance evaluation is to improve practice. This was not making any link 
to income allocation models; but provided an illustration of the utility of a cognitive 
information-processing model. At the same time, Otley and Peirce (1995)4 provided an 
analysis of the impact of leadership style on reactions to control systems in public accounting 
firms. This study used a questionnaire to all audit seniors in three of the large audit firms. 
Dysfunctional behaviours measured were under-reporting of time and audit quality reduction 
behaviour. This study in particular identified the paradox of the more structured leadership 
by audit managers leading to ambiguity and conflict in their staff: when there was not enough 
time to complete a highly structured audit review, the apparent clarity of the process was 
compromised by uncertainty among audit staff as to how to complete the plan as required. 
Theories of the firm 
Other researchers have drawn on the economics-based literature for analysis of profit sharing 
methods. For example, Fama and Jensen's theory of the firm was the basis for the 1998 
Holmes and Zimmer study5 looking at equal sharing compared with performance-based 
methods. They predicted that local firms would share equally, and national partnerships on a 
performance basis. The data set was 16 inter"iewees, representing 30 firms. The analysis 
refined these responses into six variables, and of the 30 firms, nine used profit sharing based 
on percentage of equity, eight used equal profit sharing after an initial buying-in period, and 
3 Hunt, S. C. 1995. A review and synthesis of research in performance evaluation in public accounting. Journal of 
Accounting LiteralUJ'e Vol 14 pages \07 - 139. 
4 Otley, D. T. & Pierce B. 1. 1995. The Control Problem in Public Accounting Firms: an empirical study of the 
impact of leadership style. AOS 20 (5): 405 - 420 
S Holmes, S & Zimmer, 1. 1998. The structure of profit sharing schemes in accounting partnerships. AccoUJ'lting 
and Finance 38: 51-70 
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13 used performance-based methods. Their analysis indicated that the greater the teamwork 
throughout the practice and the more geographically dispersed, the greater the variance in 
profit shares. This study lacked any temporal dimension linking their analysis to changes in 
the firms other than geographic dispersion. Although this was the period when the Big 8 
names were adopted by these firms, and some of the 30 firms would have been Big 8, they 
did not consider the effect of trends to more corporatisation or institutionalisation in the CPA 
firms as suggested by Brown et al in 19966• 
Leibowitz & Tollison undertook a study basing the theory of the firm on the Alchian-
Demsetz model, but specific to the legal profession7, with some comparisons to the medical 
profession. This premised that as larger firms retained the principle of equal sharing of 
profits, one would observe increasing problems of monitoring inputs and free-riding 
behaviour. However this study lacked specific data on the types of profit-sharing 
arrangements in the two professions. 
Modelling the budget exercise in partnerships was considered by Narayanan8 (1995) to 
require a multi-period model, instead of a single-period game. This was mainly due to the 
difficulties in observing individual partner outputs. Narayanan recognised that remuneration 
could not be tied exclusively to outputs; and the larger the practice, the greater the moral 
hazard problem created by budget balancing constraints. Narayanan did not specify how 
distribution of profits occurred, merely observing that they were distributed in "a pre-
determined manner". 
Practitioner literature 
The practitioner literature regularly provides reviews of partner compensation; an early 
commentary by Shaw9 reported on a survey of CA firms, which reflected divergence of 
practices for both the requirement for capital contributions, retirement programmes and 
bonuses for particular achievements. The arrangement for distribution of profits showed that 
60% of the CA firms paid salaries before the profit distribution; and half of these paid all 
partners the same salaries. This survey also proyides a range of adjustments; some firms in 
determining adjustments in partner's participation used both economic and non-economic 
factors. The 1991 Journal of Accountancy reported a further review of selecting the best 
method for partner compensation by Martin lO, suggesting five methods, some of which may 
6 Brown, John L, Cooper, David J, Greenwood, Royston, Hinings, C R. 1996. Strategic alliances within a big-six 
accounting firm: A case study. International Studies of Management & Organization. 26 (2): 59-80. 
1 Leibowitz, A & Tollison, R. 1980. Free Riding, Shirking and Team Production in Legal partnerships Economic 
Inquiry 18 pages 380 - 394. 
• Narayanan, V. G. 1995. Moral Hazard in repeated professional partnerships. CAR 11(2): 895 - 917 
• Shaw, W. R. 1966. Partners' compensation. Journal of Accountancy 122: 51 - 55. 
10 Martin, R. B. 1991. Selecting the Best Method of Partner compensation. Journal of Accountancy Dec. pages 40 -
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be used in combination: 
Arbitrary - sometime viewed as historical accident. It may be a stepped method, or 
all salaries determined relative to the top partner salary. A subset of this method is the "King" 
method, where the managing partner determines compensation for all partners. 
Objective formula: usually incorporating collected charge time, new clients, client 
load managed, years as a partner, and in some firms interest on contributed capital or a return 
on equity. 
Compensation by Objectives: based on negotiation between a management 
committee and individual partners, often on a points based system 
Component parts: where certain activities are each given a weighting, such as 
chargeable hours, practice development, client load, seniority, in-firm responsibilities, 
interest on capital etc. 
Paper Slip: when all partners write done how they believe the profits should be 
allocated, and averages applied. 
Martin concluded that when the existing system breaks down, any new system should be 
chosen on the basis of being least disruptive; those systems which evaluate difference aspects 
of contribution are preferable to those based on one performance measure. 
Similarly, a consideration of compensation systems for legal partnerships by Weil et al 
(1987)1 I described three main systems: a subjective performance-related system; the lock-step 
or equal sharing systems, and objective performance-related systems. They concluded that 
compensation systems need to be changing dynamically as partner needs and goals change. 
A comparison by Landis (1986) between legal partnerships and accounting firms in Australia 
described the Hale & Dorr system applying to legal firms: this is a pro-rated income system 
where there is a pre-determined weighting given to: who obtained the business; who did the 
work; and how profitable it was l2• Landis concluded in much the same vein as Weil et ai, 
going so far as to recommend use of outside consultants when changes had to be made to 
avoid proposals being viewed as self-serving. 
The 1990 review of partner compensation by Lenz and Mudrickl3 listed various systems as: 
1. Democratic systems, such as the 
44 
II Weil, R 1., Bower, W. A & Roy, P. 1987. Paying partners and stockholders: a multi-faceted decision. Legal 
Economics 13 (2): 26 - 33. 
12 Landis, M. 1986. Partnership Profit Sharing. The Chartered Accountant in Australia VoL 57 July pages 34 - 39. 
Il Lenz, K. R & H L Mudrick. 1990. Partner compensation. The CPA Journal July pages 8 - 15 
6 
.. _ ......... _ .... Pag~? : 
Equal distribution system; 
Lock-step system, where groups of partners who enter as a cohort have the same 
compensation; or 
Seniority or Longevity systems. 
For all these three the firm must not only experience steady and unabated growth, but also 
selectivity on partner admissions; 
2. Buying and Selling Time: where each partner is assigned an inside hourly rate and an 
outside hourly rate, with various formula for allocation of overhead and centralised costs. 
The disadvantage of this is that client service becomes secondary, and it promotes 
individualism among partners; 
3. Committee systems - using both objective data and some subjective assessment; 
4. The "Benevolent Dictator" - when one person, usually the firm founder, provides 
leadership and determines income allocation; 
5. Points and Percentage systems: usually formula systems including the Hale & Dorr 
systems as already described, business organisation, hours billed or hours worked; 
6. Rough Justice, using a compensation committee and also tiers of compensation. 
Further analysis by Lenz and Mudrick identified problems with each of these systems, and 
also that the size of the firm affects the choice of system. In the largest firms, management 
cannot know every partner personally and tend to rely mostly on formula and objective data. 
Although nearly all of the above literature has been short on firm-specific data and 
differences between the firms, there was some discussion of this in Mark Stevens,J4 1981 
book on the Big 8: he suggested that partner compensation in the Big 8 was 50% higher than 
that in the average small CPA firm (a suggestion which was not borne out from comments by 
New Zealand partners). Stevens also suggested that all partners in the Big 8 had to contribute 
capital when becoming a partner; again, this was not always the case in New Zealand in the 
largest firms. At that time, Stevens describes the PW partners as offering the highest average 
earnings to partners, and capital contributions are deducted from annual earnings. 
In general terms this extant literature demonstrates a variety of descriptive and analytical 
methodologies to study income allocation systems, many of which may recognise the 
contribution that the 'rainmakers' make to the success of the partnership; and a few also link 
their results to firm characteristics. However, there is an absence in this research of linkage to 
14 Stevens, M. 1981. The Big Eight. NY: t>.1acmillan Books. 
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firm-specific organisational change; in particular if the allocation methods changed as the 
firms were affiliated and then franchised to Big 8 names. Merger events were also significant, 
as one system has to be agreed upon by the newly merged firm. 
In order to review how compensation systems \\ere organized in the Big 8 and their 
predecessor firms in New Zealand, it is important to consider the impact of organisational 
dynamics in income allocation. This study covers the 30-year period when the Big 8 and their 
predecessor firms changed from local partnerships to nationally networked partnerships and 
then to franchises or offices of the Big 8. These processes are summarised in broad terms in 
Table 1. We will also document that when such organisations adopted similar corporate 
models, their income allocation models remained heterogenous and diverse. 
[Insert "Table 1: Time-chart of macro -economic and client company changes and 
impacts on CA firms in NZ" about here) 
The specific research questions addressed in this report are: 
1. How was income allocated in the Big 8 and their predecessor firms in New Zealand? 
2. Why is stability for income allocation systems compromised by the need for these 
systems to accommodate the 'rainmakers'? 
The following discussion will re\iew applications of agenc) theory, and theories of the firm, 
as already described, and propose an alternative theoretical perspective. 
These two questions will be reviewed using both findings from the survey of 108 Big 8 
partners in May 2002; and interviews in 2002 with 40 partners from the Big 8 and their 
predecessor firms in the 1980s. 
This study will proceed as follows: 
A description of the sources of the data: the survey and the oral history inten'iews 
Reporting what survey participants thought was significant about income allocation 
to ensure survival of the firms - one comment was 'if you got it right, it would stay 
right'; but this was not supported by inter\'iew responses. 
A description of mechanisms for income allocation in the Big 8 and their predecessor 
firms, mostly derived from interview transcripts; identifying instead that such 
systems are characterised by constant flux; 
A case study comparing and contrasting two firm changes, illustrated by partner 
narratives from two firms: Coopers & Lybrand and Deloittes Haskins Sells; 
A discussion of the drivers to changing models, largely caused by the variety of 
8 
'- ---- ----- -------
---_._- .... _._._- -_. -_ ... -- - _ ..... _ . -------,-
._-_ ... _- .. - ... _--_ ... _-_ .... 
behaviours by partners necessary for the firms to survive: "professional firms Iiye or 
die by the rainmakers". 
It will be suggested that the previous advocacy of agency perspectives and theory of the 
firm theoretical perspectives to explain income allocation processes do not provide a 
close fit with the data from this study. Instead, a population ecology approach (as adopted 
in organisational theory) is invoked to explain the constant flux in the choice of income 
allocation models in accounting partnerships. 
2. Sources of data: a Survey and Oral History interviews 
This study commenced with an examination of partner movements between CA firms, 
tracking these from Yearbooks published by the New Zealand Society of Accountants. 1976 
was the first time the Yearbooks provided the names of partners in each firm; the last 
occasion this was published was the June 1994 Yearbook. This process of partner 
identification resulted in 514 partners to be surveyed: this comprised of all 124 partners who 
moved between Big 8 firms, plus ali other partners anytime 1982 - 1992 in the firms: 
19 in Lawrence Anderson Buddie - affiliated to Andersens 
86 from Touche Ross 
30 in KMG Kendons 
plus 83 partners who stayed in one firm from 1982 - 1992: 
11 - Kirk Barclay/Spicer & Oppenheim 
5 - Price Waterhouse 
30 - Coopers & Lybrand 
14 - Peat Marwick 
23 - Deloittes 
plus 171 Partners who were in Ernst & Whinney or Arthur Young over the merger 
period at least for more than one year in the 1986 - 1990 years. 
From this total of 514 names, 488 addresses were identified from the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants address database. 108 partners responded to the survey. Within the survey those 
members who were retired were asked, as part of the suryey, if they were willing to be 
considering being interviewed for this Oral History Project. 36 expressed a willingness to 
receive more information on this stage. All 26 retired members who consented to Oral 
History participation were interviewed (July - September 2002). There were some gaps in the 
9 
.. - ---_ .. __ ... -. ...... . . . ..... _-- .. - .. -~~~= .. -----
cohort, in that there was insufficient coverage of all firms. A further 31 non-retired 
respondents who had answered positively to the question: "Are you willing to be contacted 
further for any clarification of points raised in your response, or for meeting in group 
discussion with a focus group, if appropriate?" were asked if they would like to be part of the 
Oral History cohort. Fourteen of these agreed, resulting in a total cohort of 40. These had not 
worked for just 40 firms; the number of firms in which this cohort had worked, including 
both large and small firms, totalled 76 CA partnerships. 
Interviewees in the oral history project were from all the large firms, and the length of the 
country, both urban and rural; 'from Cape Reinga to the Bluff. The objective of the 
interviews was to discuss and review the reasons for the survival of the remnant Big 4 firms, 
and to discuss factors that had contributed to the collapse of other large firms in New Zealand 
in the 1980s. In particular, the interviews focused on the subjects' opinions on income-
sharing models, as the survey had identified a diverse range of opinions on the significance of 
financial integration as a key to survival of each firm. Analysis of the survey and oral history 
transcripts provide the foundation for the following sections of this study. 
One issue raised by Burrows and Black was the difference between the Big 8 and second tier 
firms in income allocation models. This report is not extended to second tier firms, but the 
data gathered from firms outside of the Big 8 as part of this study, such as KMG Kendons, 
may be deemed non-Big 8 and would provide comparisons, although that is beyond the scope 
of this report. The Big 8 and their predecessor firms and partner numbers are shown in Table 
2. The 108 respondents to the survey based their responses on their experiences in these 
firms. 
[Insert "Table 2: Partner numbers in the Big 8 firms and their predecessor firms" 
about here] 
3. The Survey 
The questions asked in the survey were: 
Question 1. What would you consider were three key factors which contributed to the 
survi\'al ofCA firms after 1992? 
Overall, 10% of the respondents considered that income issues were one of the three 
most important factors, either describing this as being financially integrated; a true 
national firm, or in terms of income growth / satisfaction for partners. There was 
some variety in the level of responses from different firms when disaggregation was 
undertaken (see Table 3). 
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Question 2. What do you consider were key factors which contributed to the reduction in size 
or disappearance oflarge CA firms during the late 1980s? 
Overall, 8% of the respondents considered that income allocation models were one of 
the three most important factors, either describing it as lack of financial integration; 
dissatisfaction with income for partners, or succession issues. There was a general 
consistency in the level of responses from different firms when disaggregation was 
undertaken (see Table 3). 
Question 3: What do you consider were key issues in large firm mergers? 
Overall, only 3% of the respondents considered that income allocation models were 
one of the three most important factors in large firm mergers, either describing it as 
financial integration of income model; income for partners or succession issues. 
There was considerable variety in the level of responses from different firms (see 
Table 3) with half the firms out of the 6 firms for which disaggregation was 
undertaken showing it being considered insignificant i.e. less than I % of reasons 
given; while others perceived it as important. 
[Insert "Table 3: Responses from survey disaggregated by firm" about here] 
Coopers and Lybrand partners showed consistently high levels of identifying financial 
aspects of partnership activities as important to survival, and also Ernst & Young partners. 
Coopers and Lybrand and Arthur Young were the two firms that had a long tradition of 
complete financial integration nation-wide and respondents from those firms appeared to see 
this as contributing to their successful survival more than in firms that retained local office 
profit pools. The Arthur Young model was adopted after the merger to Ernst & Young. These 
results from this survey, and the range of opinions concerning the significance of income 
allocation models in the differential survival of the Big 5, led to this aspect being addressed 
in the Oral History interviews. One objective of the questions in the interviews was to 
identify how profits were distributed in the Big 8. It had been anticipated that partners from 
the successful surviving firms would relate some stabilisation in their income allocation 
models, and that some reflection of partner satisfaction would arise in the interviews with 
members of the surviving firms. This prediction as not substantively supported in data from 
the oral history interviews. 
4. Oral History interview data 
A summary of the income allocation systems, as described in the interviews, is compiled in 
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Table 4. 
[Insert "Table 4: Income allocation systems in the Big 8" about bere] 
It can be seen that there was a dynamic underpinning all the systems; they were only rarely 
described as stable by any of the interviewees, usually alluding to a much earlier period. 
However, this Table does not provide information on the drivers to these changes. In order to 
illustrate the drivers in two cases, more detail is proyided by the following comparison of 
extensive narrative, concerning Deloitte Haskins Sells, and Coopers and Lybrand. 
5. The narratives: A comparison of two firms. 
1. Coopers and Lybrand (and its predecessor firm Barr Burgess & Stewart) changed from a 
nationally integrated equal-share remuneration system to a formula-based: 
"The original old Barr Burgess & Stewart, the very beginning, was an old style "we 
look after you" type approach, a family approach, very much a family approach. It 
gradually evolved into a reward system. There were masses of refinements over a 
long period to try and make it fairer and fairer and acceptable to everybody, so 
everybody felt that it was fair. ... Initially Barr Burgess & Stewart had a very 
structured approach: new partners came in at what they called fIXed salaries for the 
first three years, and maybe it went to five years after a while. So they just came up, 
gradually, on steps, and then there were another series of other steps for the main 
partners, but they were very broad steps, and you just got paid what was called your 
basic salary for that, and then you had a share of profits at the end. It was very non-
abrasive in that there wasn't a lot of discussion about individuals ' incomes; it was 
you were on a level. 
Down the track it became Coopers & Lybrand; further on the firm became much 
bigger, and there was a lot more dissimilarity about the offices and the contribution 
made by partners, [it] became a much more complicated system; where every year 
the meeting. there'd be meetings by the executive which would decide on the base 
salary, if you like to call it that, or base profit share, that everybody was on. It 
became more and more complicated. It became what we call local office profit-
sharing, so that you got your base, but then depending on how well your office did at 
the end of the year, your final remuneration or your bonus or whatever you'd like to 
call it, tended to relate to how well your office did. It [was J a huge change from the 
original. 
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(Q: Why was that?) 
Mainly to keep partners happy, particularly city partners; .. . the city offices tended to 
do a lot better than the provincial offices, although they would fluctuate, and there 
was a lot bigger demand on the young particularly, and all I suppose, city partners, 
to perform. They could see that their return to their office was quite significant. Plus 
there was comparison to other partners in other firms in the cities, and therefore 
there was a push that they needed greater reward to keep them operating in the 
cities. Most of the provincial partners were very good in my opinion, and they 
accepted the philosophy of it, although there would sometimes be some complaints " 
"If we go back to this change in the remuneration policy, it was well after I'd been in 
Barr Burgess & Stewart. So it went on in its old way for quite a long time. But once 
the change came, it was a small change and then became tighter and tighter as 
people accepted the way it was done, and felt it fair as a remuneration policy could 
be, and it had a little bit of a carrot in it, in [that} it made people: "they want to get 
ahead., try harder. " At the same time [it] made some partners perhaps comfortable, 
in that they didn't want to work long hours and control big staff bases. Then they 
didn't feel uncomfortable, the fact that they were allowed to do that, although an 
incentive was on most partners; the general incentive was to try and get everybody 
going like rockets" ( ex Managing Partner, Coopers and Lybrand) 
From the other side a partner who was never on the remuneration committee commented: 
"Coopers, you got your income distribution at the end of the year [and} you knew 
what every partner earned. You never knew what the formula was that got there; I 
mean we had an idea; they told you the sort of issues that were considered: there 's 
the financial ones in terms of fee loads, and partner performance and profit 
contribution and all those sort of things ... it 's just you've just got to make sure it fits 
in with everybody ... 
The only downside I can see in some of the ways profits hove been split is that .... 
partners that appear to be overloaded in terms of their fee base have been reluctant 
to maybe release fees to partners who aren't in that position; and they've held onto 
them because they know it's going to generate maybe a bit more profit at year end 
rather than spread it around. Again, I know Coopers used to recognise skills too, 
contribution in terms of skills; some of the guys, as you would know, are in these 
particular cases highly skilled. Some of the corporate finance guys, and so forth, and 
tax guys. I mean, they were big income earners when I was there. " (Coopers and 
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Lybrand partner) 
2: Deloitte Haskins Sells (and its predecessor firm Hutchison Hull) retained individual 
offices determining their own distribution for many years after other firms had become 
integrated nationally; it moyed to a national system only five years ago 
"When I became apartner [in 1980J Auckland had its own profit pool. Hamilton had 
its own profit pool. We had offices in ""a pier, Palmers ton North. In the South Island 
we've only ever had Christchurch and Dunedin... It was just pure sort of 
parochialism. People were saying 'Well, hang on, we don't want to be swamped by 
something that happens in the big Auckland, Wellington offices ' ... They'd say 'Well, 
ifwe keep our own office profit pool, then what I do influences what I get'. Whereas 
when you go into a national profit pool, if you work another hour a day it doesn't 
make any difference at all; or no perceived direct difference. But that's a very small-
minded way of looking at the thing ... 
When Ifirstjoined back in '80 I think you started off on a set number of units, and it 
took you seven years to get to a quality, once you'd been there seven years - some of 
us got there faster than that. Once you became a full partner, then everybody apart 
from the managing partner got the same income; the same units. That, over the 
years, has gradually changed, so that now profit-sharing is done on a perceived 
contribution to the firm as a whole, and there is a much wider range of income levels 
between the lowest earning full' partner to the highest earning full partners .... we 
ran as a national firm but separate office profit pools, until relatively recently, 
probably [it] would it have been about '98, maybe. (Deloittes partner). 
[Now J every several years, like about every three or four years, we review our profit-
sharing scheme and change it. Because it's a zero sum game, profit-sharing is a very 
difficult task to go through and it's an unpleasant thing. You never get a position 
where everybody's happy, and we continually seek to find a system that's fairer than 
the one lI'e've currently got. People perceive themselves as making a contribution to 
the firm that is different from the perception that almost everyone of their other 
partners will have of their contribution. It is a very difficult thing to do, to find a way 
to share profits that everyone's happy with. So we finish up with a system; well, we 
have continually finished up with systems where probably 70 per cent of partners say 
'Yes, that system's sort of broadly fair '. 30 per cent say 'No, I don't think it's right '. 
The people who earn the top normally think they should get more. The people who 
earn the bottom think that they should get more. It's very difficult". (Deloittes 
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partner). 
Although these are examples of only two firms, from all the interviews it is clear that all the 
firms show constant flux in the manner in which income was allocated. Furthermore, some 
firms were reverting to systems previously typical of smaller second-tier firms, in that each 
office of Big 6 firm would have its own profit pool with a national levy. Some second-tier 
offices were found to have identical systems, in particular those which affiliated to national 
franchises at the leyel below the Big 8; in such cases these would have some national levy to 
cover centralised costs, and after that organise their own distribution according to decisions 
of each local office. 
6. Why the constant flux? 
In common with the findings from Burrows and Black, the data from the Big 8 firms in New 
Zealand and their predecessor firms show diverse levels of shares for established partners. As 
Burrows and Black had not the opportunity to track changes over several decades, this 
research adds to their findings by demonstrating that methods of dividing partnership profits 
did not stabilise. Was this, as Lenz and Mudrick claims, a result of the size of the firm 
affecting the choice of systems? An examination of the numbers of partners in 1994 (as 
provided in Table 2) would not support this claim as all firms went through the growth of 
partner numbers in the late 80s, and then shedding numbers in the 1990s; none of the 
respondents attributed changes in systems to changes in size. Additionally, the Case study in 
Section 5 of this report shows two firms of similar sizes moving in opposite directions in the 
income allocation models. At the most simple level, as soon as a firm has multiple physical 
offices any equal-sharing systems typical of small firms is moderated by combination of 
subjective assessment and the more objective formula abased on billings/chargeable 
hours/recovery rates and the year-end wips. Instead, the interview data providing the 
foundation for this study reveals that there was a necessity for constantly changing patterns of 
partnership behaviour, patterns that were essential for the firms to survive and thrive, and this 
was one of the drivers to the constant flux in partnership income allocation models. 
7. Variety in partner activities necessary for the finns to survive: "Professional 
firms live or die by the rainmakers". 
This comment by a partner from Cooper and Lybrand reflects ideas often expressed in 
interviews: that you could not reward partners in accounting firms solely on a formula based 
on billable hours or hours charged. A firm needs to devote resources to finding new business 
constantly, otherwise it will not survive. One description of those partners who can generate 
work is rainmakers, elsewhere three categories are described: 
15 
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"The way Buddie & Co developed in its profit-sharing [was} largely at my behest, 
and the approximate equal input was a subjective assessment of the manner in which 
partners' talents were applied. You can have a partner who plays golf every 
Wednesday afternoon, networks well, and attracts and secures a vast amount of 
work. You can have the hardworking partner who's technically sound but not a good 
networker, who doesn't attract work but produces work. ... I think a good description 
is the finders, minders and grinders description of partners in professional firms" 
(Deloitte Haskins Sells partner) 
Another partner now in a small firm separate from the Big 8 noted: 
"In this team here, we've got a couple of stars, and their skills are amazing in 
acquiring new work. It's something I've never had the gift of doing. I guess I'd fit 
into the grinder one, 1 would think, I'd have to admit that .... some of the guys in this 
practice generate huge fees, and generate new work, and I really admire the skill. 
It's amazing, you know, they work hard at it, long hours". (Kendons KMG partner) 
A schematic representation in Figure 2 acknowledges that these descriptors are not tight 
boundaries, and partners may need to move rapidly between different activities as other 
partners retire, enter or change the relative weighting of their roles. It ignores a possible 
fourth group: the free-riders (or almost free-) who may be drawing a salary incommensurate 
with their contribution, irrespective of whichever of the three areas they may have earlier 
estabiished their reputation and seniority. The improbability of shirkers is further discussed 
in Section 8 of this report. 
[Insert "Figure 2: Finders, Minders and Grinders" about here] 
"1 had a lot of very wealthy clients, who were very well connected; and I suppose, in 
crude terms, 1 knew how to work it ... when you have the sort of assessment systems 
they [P W} have... 'cos a lot of them don't like to do it on subjective bases, they won't 
take the risk of doing it. 1 did take that risk; and was amply rewarded, by two people 
who I had huge respect for .... I trusted them; and they trusted me to bring the bacon 
home". (PriceWaterhouse partner) 
Given that these three functions need to be attended to in any size partnership, the problem is: 
any system based solely on the number of hours of work charged or revenues earned by a 
partner overlooks the necessity of all three roles to be fulfilled within a partnership. Another 
whose father was in a small sole practice recalled: 
"Some firms had arguments was that your contribution is based on your fees. Others 
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it's based on the chargeable hours; both of which are subject to all sorts of 
manipulation if you're not very careful. Again, quoting my father, he always used to 
say, "If I'm short of work I'll go for a walk down Hereford Street and I'll pick up a 
job before I get back to the office n. Now how do you measure that contribution to the 
firm? He had that ability because of his name [Ray Holland] (Ernst & Whinney 
partner) 
And from a larger firm: 
"No one has really resolved how to fairly distribute professional income, because 
professional firms live or die by the rainmakers that they've got and the rainmakers 
can be either individuals or they can be associations. So you can never say why a 
firm is successful in achieving specific work. It was the initial contact that gives you 
that. Jfyou do it properly then it builds on that ... The rainmakers are the finders. The 
minders are those who make sure that the risks are managed properly; and that 
things don't go off the tracks; and the grinders are those who are sitting there down 
in the middle, working, with the whip [wip?Jj] over them ... " (Coopers & Lybrand 
partner) 
Herein lies one possible answer to the conundrum: just as the professional firm needed to 
have all three types of partners in order for the firm to sun'ive, the extent to which any 
particular partner would be involved with anyone of the three activities would yary year by 
year. The change even when just one major audit manager shifted to take more responsibility 
for the operations of the partnership would drive slight changes in the balance of work 
undertaken by all the other partners. As each partner moved through the different roles of 
finders, minders and grinders, so they would seek to be rewarded the same as, or more so 
than, previously, but all the while the management/remuneration committee is required to use 
a formula that could still be seen as equitable for all three types of activities. It is suggested 
from this study that the constant flux in income allocation models in Big 8 firms were partly 
caused by the necessity for the model to reward partners as they adopted different roles in the 
partnership, with none losing out significantly. 
8. Discussion 
It is clear from the data provided from the survey and oral history interviews that attempts to 
examine and explain the differences in partnership profit allocation systems by firm size 
(Lenz & Mudrick, 1990) were not supported by this data. Secondly, attempts to examine 
partnership profit allocation systems by agency theory are also not supported by this research. 
IS Work in progess 
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Agency theories posits that the standard agency problems of shirking and monitoring will 
arise in partnerships; however, to describe this as typical of agency relationships overlooks 
that shirking and monitoring can be directly detected in outputs by partners, due to the 
individual partners (or more likely the manager under the partner) maintaining records of 
their chargeable hours, billings, recovery rate and wip. A partner who shirks will not be in a 
position to fabricate a claim to same earnings capacity as one who maintains a higher level of 
chargeable hours. Two other agency problems identified by Gibson and Mnookin l6 (1985) are 
(1) grabbing - i.e. threatening to depart if they do not get more than their fair share; and (2) 
leaving and taking clients with them. The widespread establishment of remuneration 
committees and the desire of partnerships to shed partners and improve leverage would give 
few partners the opportunity to effectively exercise this type of threat to the extent of gaining 
the rights to an extra-fonnula allocation. The increasing prevalence of restraints of trade 
clauses iIi partnership agreements is also an inhibition to this behaviour. 
Burrows and Black predicted that an agency theory was supported, as there had occurred a 
shift away from equal sharing to variable profit shares in their study. However, any such 
driver clearly identifiable as an agency- type was not indicated in any comments by 
interviewees as a driver for the changes, nor supported by the illustration in section 5 of this 
report. One might have expected partners to explain the causes of the changes reflecting the 
phenomena of "grabbing, leaving, shirking or monitoring" if the agency framework is useful 
in understanding these phenomena. None such explanations for the constant flux in allocation 
models were identified in the interview transcripts. 
One further aspect which requires discussion in this study is the trend claimed by Brown, 
Cooper, Greenwood and Hinings (1996)17 of CA finns to move away from the professional 
partnerships to what they call Managerial Professional Bureaucracy, characterised by 
hierarchical structures, strategic planning processes and other corporate-type features. This 
could be viewed as one type of survival stmtegy, or as a process whereby the CA finns were 
mimicking, albeit a delayed response, to the rise of the professional manager in their clients. 
It is valid to view the introduction of remuneration committees in the CA firms as an increase 
in hierarchical structure, but the constant revolution of membership on these committees, and 
the essentially democmtic processes universally adopted in the appointment of the managing 
partner do not mimic the corporate world so closely as to completely validate the suggestion 
of the shift to such "managerial professional bureaucracies". They are most closely seen in 
16 Gilson, 1. R. & R. H. Mnookin. 1985. Sharing among the human c~pita1ists: an economic inquiry into the 
corporate law firm and how partners split profits. Stanford Law Review 31 (2): 313 - 392. 
17 Brown, John L, Cooper, David J, Greenwood, Royston, Hinings, C R. 1996. Strategic alliances within a big-six 
accounting firm: A case study. International Studies of Management & Organization. 26 (2): 59-80. 
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the CA firms which have international or Australasian partners (such as Arthur Andersen or 
PricewaterhouseCoopers) where there is necessarily an increased hierarchical organisation to 
enable control to be adequately exercised over the geographically distant offices controlled 
by one managing partner. 
It is suggested instead that the data in this study shows: 
1. Constant change in allocation systems 
2. This lack of stability caused by dissatisfaction with the negotiated formulae or 
management committee decisions e.g. 
"How you split the income, and that was always the most contentious issue. 
Never the quantum. But if you were a partner and I'm a partner, and you got 
$10, $5 000 more than me, why were you better than me? You could have 
doubled the payout, but if you got $1, 000 more than me, you 'd still be 
wanting to know - I'd want to know why, you know - When 1 was on the 
management board: you would allocate the income; you would have input 
from the managing partner, each office, and you'd go away as a board and 
say this is how we're going to allocate the income for the year. Then the 
partners had the right to come back and appeal, and we'd spend more 
bloody time on the allocation of income and trying to explain to partners 
how we saw, perceived someone to be better than someone else, or not 
performing as well, than anything else" (Arthur Young partner) 
3. Systems changed in the relative importance of component parts to the allocation, and 
the relative importance of subjective performance assessments yis-a-vis formula 
based. 
4. An absence of any pure objective performance-related system in the Big 8 - 4 in New 
Zealand, although there was historic evidence of one such system occurring before 
1970 (See Appendix 1). 
Instead of a theory of the firm or agency perspective, it appears more fruitful to apply a 
population ecology approach (as adopted in organisational theory) to examine the dynamic 
patterns in income allocation models. A population ecology approach is also supported by the 
evidence from the interviews that although changes occurred in the firms, it was not a steady 
change, but showed the characteristics of a punctuated equilibrium, with intervening periods 
of statis, as modelled by evolutionary biologists' 8• Punctuation equilibrium theory explains 
'8 Gould, Stephen Jay and Niles Eldredge. 1993. Punctuated equilibrium comes of age. Nature, Nov 18, V. 366 
(6452): 223-227 
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that evolutionary patterns depend on the 'differential success' of individual stable species 
types, in this case, the individual firms competing with each other for clients and retention of 
personnel, and supports the invocation of a population ecology approachl9. This requires 
unbundling three aspects of income allocation models. 
Firstly, an examination of variations in behaviour is presented, identifYing distinct and 
different strategies adopted by the chartered accountancy firms over the period of study. 
Variations may be intended or unintended; it does not matter. This has been represented in 
earlier sections ofthis report. 
Secondly, some differential survival (selection) within the cohort of chartered accountancy 
firms is identified, including the disintegrations of firms and the appearance of a dominant 
firm during a merger event. The dominance of Arthur Young in the Ernst & Young merger, 
and the dominance of the Deloittes Haskins Sells partners in the Deloitte - Touche merger is 
an example ofthis20. KMG Kendons disappeared after losing the KMG affiliation when the 
transatlantic merger of KMG with Peat Marwick Mitchell occurred. Lawrence Anderson 
BuddIe also disintegrated, after losing the Andersen's affiliation and the defection of the 
Auckland office to Deloitte Haskins Sells. 
Third, the question remains whether or not this study was able to identifY retention 
mechanisms that allow the income allocation models of those firms that have survived to be 
retained or copied by other chartered accountancy firms. This is an elusive issue. There may 
be been some mimicry, but the responses to the survey indicated that it was only the most 
successful firms which saw income allocation models as important in their survival, and 
respondents from less successful firms did not. However, copying of systems would be 
encouraged by contributions to the common know-ledge about suitable methods, such as CPD 
courses, partner movements, and articles in practitioner journals as cited earlier in this report. 
A population ecology approach enhances the understanding of the constant flux in income 
allocation processes, because these can be most usefully viewed as a series of sun'ival 
strategies in response to (1) any externally-imposed merger, (2) disequilibrium in the pecking 
order among partners which may follow (I); (3) the activities of other chartered accountancy 
firms, mergers in particular, and (4) external factors. In particular, from the interview 
transcripts some of the factors contributing to the instability include the impact of externally 
imposed mergers, the effects of the rapid inflation in the 1980s followed by the subsequent 
economic downturn, the effects of the 1987 Crash, and the rapid reduction in the number of 
19 Perrow, C., 1986, Complex Organizations - a Critical Essay. 3rd edition. New York: McGraw-Hili Publishing 
Company. 
10 Baskerville, R F & D Hay. 2001 . Strategies for professional firm survival: A population ecology approach to 
accounting fllIl1s in New Zealand" presented at the AAANZ Conference, Auckland, July 2001 
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new audit clients (as illustrated in Figure 1). 
Distinctive and different categories of income allocation processes can be observed from the 
data presented in this paper. Retention mechanisms would have permitted income allocation 
models perceived as successful to be mimicked, but no system appeared to be retained for a 
long period. (The cases of PriceWaterhouse and Arthur Andersen are not included in this 
discussion, because these firms were both very small and dominated by international or 
Australasian partnership numbers.) We observed the most adaptive and successful firms used 
changing income allocation models as one adaptive process in their 'basket' of change 
mechanisms. A dynamic 'pecking order' is not to be disparaged. It has the capacity to both 
pacifY and empower partners as they move through age profiles and are required to take 
changing roles. Although the use of the term 'pecking order' appears fundamentally contrary 
to the notion of a partnership of equals, it is human nature to need status to be transparently 
accorded with the confirmation from peers. Thus the dynamic pattern of income allocation 
models appears as one part of adaptive behaviour in CA firms. 
9. Conclusion 
It was the objective of this preliminary report on income allocation theories and evidence 
from New Zealand to answer two research questions: how was income allocated in the Big 8 
and their predecessor firms in New Zealand, and why is stability for income allocation 
systems compromised by the need for these systems to accommodate the 'rainmakers'? The 
material from interviews and survey responses shed new information which has not been 
previously documented to the same depth in other jurisdictions. Future research on gathering 
statistical data such as changing levels of leverage in the different firms (partners/non-partner 
staff ratios), revenues, changing patterns of capital contributions and exit rules, 
organisational shifts and the relative importance of different income streams to the CA firms 
would all assist in gaining a deeper understanding the drivers to these largely hidden, but 
dynamic, processes. 
Appendix 1: A pure performance based system 
The firm of Adamson, Francis and Harrington, (later Broad Christie, affiliated to Ernst & 
Whinney), in Invercargill was rare among firms in that the income allocation to partners was 
based precisely on fees earned. As Cliff Broad remembered in the early post- Second World 
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War years: 
Part of the d.::al when I came back to a partnership [aged 24 or 25} was that those who did 
the work would get the money. Now that was very unusual. So that before Morris Christie 
and I were 30 years of age, we were earning more money in the firm than anyone else. Alan 
Harrington, [one of the partners} as a hobby, used to analyse all the staff timesheets, and 
say, that of the six partners in thefirm, you had 17.23% of Betty Brown's time, you had 6.9% 
of Charlie Smith's time. They worked out all the wages, and he divided the wages up between 
six partners. He analysed the fees you brought in, which were £21,231-8-6 and ifwe took off 
your direct staff costs your proportion of the administration staff, would be so much And 
therefore your share of the profit for the year was £J 3,250, as I say, 8/6. 
I mean it was unbelievable. He loved it .... and everyone was happy, 'cos Addie and Charlie 
were wanting to playa bit of bowls and they were good hardworking Scotch Presbyterian, 
and they definitely wanted what was theirs, and they weren't going to [have more} .... it was 
because Charlie Francis was always fair and decent - it was his idea, not Alan Harrington's. 
It wouldn't be Addies, that was Adamson. But Charlie was able to do it, because he had 
Harrington who wanted to do it. "This is a problem, it's something to be overcome ". 
Of those three partners Cliff recalled: 
Charles Francis .... probably 40 years before I did, he represented Southland as the 
Councillor for the Southland district. He was a good follow, a most unusual looking man. 
You wouldn't give two bob to look at him, but he was bright ..... Francis, as I said, was an 
unusual man, but very bright and progressive. 
Harrington was a difforent kettle of fish altogether. He was a great athlete, rugby player, 
Master of Science, First Class Honours in Mathematics and various things. And he could 
have been brilliant, but he wasn't interested I think my friend Charlie Francis used to 
despair of Alan Harrington, because he could have done anything he wanted to do, but all he 
wanted to do was enjoy his wife, family, his kids, his golf, playing cards, and he was just 
happy with his lot in life. 
Adamson was a very well known man, he was in a lot of things. He had no qualifications at 
all. But of course, in those days, you didn't. You were just starting [having] qualifications 
being essential. He was Mayor of the city; everyone knew him. At one stage after I became a 
partner, it was sort of recognised that, "oh well, that's our civic contribution "; he didn't do 
much else. But he was Mayor of the city. 
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Figure 1: New Zealand: highs and lows 
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1976 Big 8 name changes 1994 
1983 - 1984 
Wilkinson Wilberfoss 64 Arthur Young merged in 1988 
Emst& Young 83 
Hunt Duthie & Co 27 Ernst & Whinney 
Barr Burgess & Stewart 57 Coopers & Lybrand 90 
Hutchison Hull & Co 44 Deloitte Haskins Sells 
McCulloch Butler & Spence 40 merged in 1989 66 
merged in 1979 to Deloitte Touche 
McCulloch Menzies Touche Ross Tohmatsu 
Clark Menzies 24 
Gilfillan & Co 38 merged in 1977 to 
KPMGPeat 
Gilfillan Morris & Co KPMG Peat MalViick Marwick 67 
Morris Patrick & Co 19 
Price Waterhouse 13 Price Waterhouse 37 
part of Lawrence 
Lawrence Godfrey & Co 28 Anderson Buddie (1980) 
affiliated to Arthur 
Cook & Co 42 partners in 1986 Andersen 
Anderson & Co disintegrated in 1986/87 
Table 2: Partner numbers in the Big 8 firms and their predecessor firms 
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Table 3: Responses from Survey disaggregated by firm 
(There were too few responses from PW, Deloittes or KPMG partners for this 
disaggregation to be undertaken) 
Questions: What would you What do you What do you 
consider were three consider were key consider were key 
key factors which factors which issues in large firm 
contributed to the contributed to the mergers? 
survival of CA firms reduction in size or 
after 1992? disappearance of 
large CA firms 
during the late 
1980s? 
Percentage of number of reasons from those who responded that they considered financial 
issues were among the top three reasons 
108 All responses 10% of267 8% of243 3% of225 
partners 
21 Arthur 9% of 54 11% of 57 7% ofn 
J ,artners Young 
22 Emst& 11% of46 12% of41 <1% of20 
partners Whinney 
13 LAB {AA} 4%of27 15% of39 <1% of22 
partners 
19 Touche Ross 6%of44 7%of27 <1% of45 
partners 
I 8 C&L 17% of29 23% of21 11% of19 partners 
26 
.---.--- .- .~------
- -- -- -- .. 
.. ~~~~._B~~chey - [\~ p.aE~~~ R~ ~_~~.:~<?~. _ .__ ._ 
Table 4: Income allocation systems in the Big 8 
Deloittes Younger partners gained units until a maximum was reached; it took seven 
years to achieve equality with other partners; then each office divided its 
revenues up on the basis of units held by each partner. It gradually changed; 
now based on the contribution to the firm. Reviewed ever 3 - 4 years with a 
management committee deciding on the allocation of units for each partner. 
Touch Ross Each office was autonomous, with a national levy. "We went to profit-share 
locally, we went to, afcourse, a variety of things, but Gisborne, which was 
the main one there ended up with a differential profit-sharing basis in the 
end. .. it was so-called performance based, and experience based". There was 
a major shift in 1985 -1986 to the Trupac system, which divided the firm 
into its metropolitan offices with one profit pool, and others. Trupac was to be 
a performance-based assessment; it was initiated before the DTT merger, but 
its implementation as interruJl.ted IJr. that merger. 
Ernst & Local offices operated independently of each office, and contributed to a 
Whinney national levy. Partners in local offices were placed on a progressive share; 
and moved from 60 to 100 points. This changed to a more subjective system 
of points allocation based on contribution. There was usually a two-partner 
profit sharing committee in each office. 
Arthur From very early on they had had a nation-wide system of income allocation; 
Young there was a 3-tier division of profits: 1). A salary was paid to each partner; 
then 2). interest on capital contributed; "The older you were the more capital 
you had to contribute. And you'd be in, say, A group, which had to contribute 
£20,000 or something [per annum}. B group had to contribute £15,000 and C 
group £10,000. And that depended upon your age. " 3). The remaining surplus 
was split equally. This changed to remuneration based on fees generated, 
controlled by a national remuneration committee, and this system was 
continued after the merger with Ernst & Whinney. 
KPMG Each office was a separate autonomous partnership for profit sharing, with a 
national levy for national costs. Smaller offices usually had their 
remuneration worked out on the fees earned. "Once you had been partner for 
5 years you earned the same ". The calculation was based on a movement 
over five years from 60 - I 00 points. This system changed to Auckland and 
Wellington now having one profit pool. 
Coopers & The previous firm, Barr Burgess & Stewart, was nationally integrated, as with 
Lybrand Arthur Young, but with a simpler system of allocation of profits once national 
costs had been deducted. "It was close to equal, it was five to ten per cent 
either side of a mean for a mature partner. A new partner coming in was on a 
lower rate for about five years. When I came in, [in 1971 J initially goodwill 
was paid. Goodwill was based on 90 per cent of your first year's income; that 
was scrapped shortly after Ijoined. "This changed to a system of local office 
profit-sharing. Each partner receiYes a base amount, topped up by a bonus 
depending on the performance of the office. It is largely formula based, 
considering fee loads, performance and profit contribution 
Price These two firms had systems very different from the other firms. Arthur 
Waterhouse Andersen started with a small firm of five Auckland partners who had all 
and Arthur come from Peats. This firm started in 1987, and took the AA name in 1989. It 
Andersen is not included in this comparison. 
Price Waterhouse had an Australasian system; all partners were Australasian 
partners. The share allocation was initially based on seniority, this changed to 
remuneration based on responsibility and performance. Even when it was 
seniority based, it reached the maximum le\o'e! quite early. 
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